W ell-grounded theories that connect neurons with behaviour are highly prized but in short supply. One behaviour we would dearly love to explain is how humans, along with some birds and mammals, 'mind-read' -that is, attribute mental states such as goals, intentions and feelings to others, to predict and understand their actions. Because others' motivations are not directly observable, the capacity to intuit them has seemed to require some special explanation.
The discovery several decades ago of 'mirror' neurons in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys spawned the idea that these neurons provide that special explanation. As described by neuroscientists Giacomo Rizzolatti and Laila Craighero, mirror neurons respond both when one monkey sees another make a certain movement and when the animals make the same movements themselves.
The idea that a brain's capacity to mindread emerges more or less automatically from the activity of mirror neurons was articulated thus by neuroscientist Marco Iacoboni in Mirroring People (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008) : "Mirror neurons undoubtedly provide, for the first time in history, a plausible neurophysiological explanation for complex forms of social cognition and interaction. " Examples of such social cognition might be my knowing what you intend when I see you head for the chicken coop with an axe in hand, or my understanding what a baseball player feels when he strikes out in the last inning. In The Myth of Mirror Neurons, cognitive scientist Gregory Hickok undertakes a balanced and detailed examination of claims that have flourished in the past ten years -that mirror neurons are the key to explaining our capacity for reading other minds.
The mirror-neuron approach to mindreading depends on the assumption that our own inner lives are transparently revealed to our own minds. So when we see someone holding an axe while heading to the hen house, that observation activates in us not only the motor programme for that movement, but also the mental state that is its normal antecedent -intent to slaughter a chicken. Simulation of observed behaviour, so this argument goes, allows us to identify others' intentions. Iacoboni declares that mirror neurons "are at the heart of how we navigate through our lives".
These are bold and promising ideas, and Hickok wants to know whether the research makes good on the promise. One basic problem that he sees is this: the evidence shows that mirror neurons respond to movements, one's own and others' . The claim is that mirror neurons reflect high-level understanding of goals. But how? Rizzolatti and his colleagues tried to address this matter by designing an experiment in which a monkey is trained either to put food in its mouth or to put an object in a cup stationed near its mouth: similar movements, different goals.
When other monkeys witness these actions, the responses of mirror neurons in their inferior parietal lobes vary depending on whether the action-performer grasps to eat or to place. So are these neurons sensitive to observing similar movements with different goals? Here things get complicated because the non-food object was taken from a jar, but the food was not. In Hickok's view, this leaves open the question of whether the mirror neurons are reading the goal or merely responding to different movements.
As Hickok sizes it up, the responses of the witness monkeys' mirror neurons seem to be explicable in terms of past associations, implying that the claim of mind-reading through simulation is superfluous. Likewise with my expectations regarding the unfortunate hen: my brain does not need to produce a simulation of your behaviour to know your motive, because in the past I have detected axe-wielding in the vicinity of chickens before they are slaughtered. Adding to the scepticism, Hickok points out that you can understand many actions that you never perform. Hickok's dog, who never throws the ball himself and thus cannot simulate ball-throwing, never theless reliably predicts the ball's trajectory by watching Hickok's arm. As for simulating feelings, I may know that a baseball player is disappointed after striking out, but feel only joy if it means my team is winning.
Some scientists sought to draw support for the simulation hypothesis from the motor theory of speech perception (MTSP). In brief, the idea of MTSP, popular in the 1950s, is that I can understand what you Moments that jolt or delight us punctuate our lives. But whereas shock might be salutary in an art gallery, it can trigger blind belief in other contexts, points out cognitive scientist Jim Davies. Expounding his theory of 'compellingness foundations', Davies synthesizes research on what makes us susceptible to gripping stimuli, such as our drives to discover patterns and to find incongruity, and our attraction to hope and fear. Scepticism, he argues, can help us to build resistance to riveting ideas that turn out to be duds.
Shocked: Adventures in Bringing Back the Recently Dead David Casarett current (2014)
In 1986, a toddler named Michelle Funk drowned and lay dead for three hours before a medical team coaxed her back to life. Decades later, relates physician David Casarett, the science of resuscitation is very much alive. In this disarmingly amusing investigation, Casarett covers breakthroughs, devices, hazards and case studies. He visits resuscitative techniques of the past, such as blowing tobacco smoke into the victim's rectum; the cellular effects of methods using electricity and low temperature; and potential future advances, including reducing metabolism.
H is for Hawk Helen Macdonald Jonathan cape (2014)
This extraordinary book is ostensibly about falconry. It actually tells how a human wild with grief came to fathom a wild mind -a process in which the question of who was being tamed was always up in the air. Writer Helen Macdonald, devastated by her father's death, took on a goshawk. Her narrative interweaves exquisitely rendered observations -of hawk behaviour, her immersion in the bird's world and what happens between them -with the life and work of author T. H. White, whose 1951 The Goshawk inspired her as a child. Soars beyond genres, and burns with emotional and intellectual intensity.
Invisible: The Dangerous Allure of the Unseen Philip Ball Bodley head (2014)
Young children, notes science writer Philip Ball, believe they vanish when they shut their eyes. Such beliefs wither, but "the dream and the desire" for invisibility remain, and Ball traces these through history. The urge has spawned occultism, stage magic, a fascination with camouflage, and legends centring on rings and cloaks. It re-emerged a century ago in the confluence of paranormal beliefs and the new physics -and, today, in optical physicists' invisibility shields. Ball argues that this "mythical lens" we train on reality inspires scientific discovery, but we need to understand its calibration. mean when you say, "The cat is swimming" by re creating that bit of speech in my brain's speech area. Language is Hickok's area of expertise, and he reminds us of the experiments that saw MTSP shelved. For example, people with a disorder called Broca's aphasia are unable to produce speech, but they can still understand it, as can children in the prespeech language-learning phase of development and people born with cerebral palsy who have severely impaired speech production. Some researchers dismiss those flaws in MTSP on the grounds that the mirrorneuron story explains language understanding. The circularity here is not reassuring.
Not least of the problems with the mirrorneuron approach is that learning mindreading skills cannot be just a matter of simulation, because such skills depend on a co-evolution of understanding of the self and of others. Recognition of one's own inner states is not a computational freebie.
How fares the hypothesis that autism is fundamentally a mirror-neuron disorder? So far, it is mixed. A deeper perspective derives from post-mortem studies of the brains of youngsters with autism. These show patches of laminar disorganization -types of neuron in the wrong layer making the wrong connections -in wide swathes of the prefrontal cortex, including areas important for executive function, motor control and social cognition, as well as areas that probably contain some mirror neurons. This suggests that autism is not primarily or essentially a disorder of a hypothetical mirror-neuron system, but a broader disorder that affects many aspects of normal brain function, including cognition.
Hickok does not for a moment deny that we mind-read. Rather, his point is that the roles of mirror neurons and simulation have been oversold. The upshot of his inquiry is an analogue of the familiar warning: if it seems too good to be true, it probably is.
Hickok's critique deserves to be widely discussed, especially because many scientists have bought into the mirror-neuron theory of action understanding, perhaps because they lack the time or inclination to peer into its workings themselves. Hickok performs a valuable service by laying out the pros and cons clearly and fairly. 
